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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

OK MOTORS, INC., d/b/a
MOUNTAIN MOTORS,
Plaintiff—Appellant

Civil No. 87021S-CA
Category No. 14b

vs.
CHARLES P. HILL,
Defendant—Respondent

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this
appeal pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-2a-3(c), as
amended in 1986.
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW
This case is an appeal from an Orc|er of the Eighth
Circuit Court for Utah County which granted the defendant's
Motion for Summary Judgment.
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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR APPEAL
1.

Whether the plaintiff/ on appeal, may assert

additional facts which it failed to timely submit to the Circuit
Court prior to the hearing of the defendant's Motion for Summary
Judgment?
2.

Whether, by virtue of the non-conformity of the

automobile to the contract, Mr. Hill made a timely and effective
rejection of its delivery, or a revocation of its acceptance?
3.

Whether, by virtue of defects rendering the automo-

bile inoperable, the contract is voidable under the doctrine of
failure of consideration?
4.

Whether, because of the oppressive and one-sided

nature of the agreement, the disclaimers of warranties set forth
in the contract are unconscionable?
DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS
The defendant believes that the following statutes,
rules and regulations are fundamental or important for a determination of the issues presented for review herein:

Utah Code

Annotated, 1953, as amended, Sections 70A-2-302, 70A-2-313,
70A-2-314 70A-2-601, 70A-2-602, 70A-2-606, 70A-2-607, 70A-2-608,
15 U.S.C.

Section 2308(b), and 16 C.F.R. § 455. Each of these

provisions is set forth in the Addendum.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature and Course of the Proceedings Below

This case is an appeal from an order granting the defendant's motion for summary judgment based upon remedies under the
Utah Uniform Commercial Code and under the common law theories of
unconscionability and failure of consideration.
On January 31, 1986, the plaintiff filed its Complaint
alleging that the defendant, Charles P. Hill, breached an
agreement to purchase a 1981 Volkswagen by virtue of Mr. Hill's
cancellation of the contract and stopping payment on the check
paid for an automobile.

(Record at 1).

Within the time required

by law, the defendant answered the plaintiff's Complaint and
filed its Counterclaim.

The defendant admitted that he had

stopped payment on the check, and affirmatively alleged that he
had cancelled his contract with the plaintiff for the reason that
shortly after the delivery of the automobile to him, it became
totally inoperable.

(Record at 5). Subsequent to the filing of

the defendant's Answer and Counterclaim, the parties performed
discovery in the nature of Interrogatories, Requests for
Production of Documents and Requests for Admissions.
21, 53, 75). On or about February 24, 1987, Mr.

(Record at

Hill filed his

Motion for Summary Judgment against the plaintiff, (Record at 95)
and on March 31, 1987, the Court entered a minute entry granting
the defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment.
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(Record at 128). A

final Order Granting Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment was
signed by the Court on May 4, 1987,
B.

(Record at 129).

Procedural Background of Motion for Summary
Judgment

With respect to the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by
Mr. Hill on February 24, 1987, it is important to note the procedural status of the case at that time. As stated, Mr. Hill's
Motion for Summary Judgment was filed on February 24, 1987.
(Record at 95). Three days thereafter, Ralph C. Amott withdrew as
counsel for the plaintiff.

(Record at 114). Michael J. Petro,

the present counsel for the plaintiff, gave notice of his
appearance as counsel for the plaintiff at the hearing on the
Motion for Summary Judgment held on March 11, 1987.
121).

(Record at

At that time, the plaintiff failed to present any counter-

affidavits or other sworn submissions to controvert either the
Affidavit of Diane S. Hill or the Defendant's Answers to the
Plaintiff's Interrogatories filed earlier in the case.
Therefore, at the time of the hearing, the plaintiff proceeded
relying only upon its Memorandum of Points and Authorities, the
arguments raised at the hearing, and its answers to the
Defendant's First Set of Interrogatories.
C.

(Record at 21).

Factual Background of Case

The appellant's statement of the case contains numerous
statements which are not factual, are erroneous or improper.
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Because several of these statements are asserted or relied upon
by the appellant throughout the body of its brief, the defendant
makes the following statement which it believes accurately
reflects the record.
1.

The Undisputed Facts on Appeal

Charles P. Hill, who was a resident of Delta, Utah at
the time in question (Record at 4), appeared at the plaintiff's
place of business on or about December 17, 1985, and on that date
was shown and test drove a 1981 Volkswagen Rabbit.

(Record at 76).

The test drive of the automobile constituted "driving the car
around two or three blocks at speeds less than 30 m.p.h.w
Thereafter, Mr.

(Id.)

Hill returned to his home in Delta, Utah.

Two days later, on December 19, 1985, Mr. Hill returned
to the plaintiff's place of business and tendered to plaintiff a
check in the amount of $2,642.88, and possession of the car was
delivered to him.

(Record at 77). Subsequent to this, Mr. Hill

drove the car toward Salt Lake City.

After driving

"approximately 50 miles from the plaintiff'ls place of business,
the car simply quit moving and would not gc forward or backward."
(Record at 79).
Because of the breakdown, Mr. Hill left the car on the
shoulder of the highway (Record at 79) and called his wife.
(Record at 116 - 117). Upon speaking with her husband, Mrs. Hill
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telephoned the plaintiff's place of business and spoke with an
employee who identified herself as "Stacy."

(Record at 117).

Stacy told Mrs. Hill that the plaintiff would tow the automobile
back to its lot and that one of her bosses would contact the
Hills regarding the breakdown.

(Record at 117). After making

numerous follow-up telephone calls to the plaintiff, the Hills
stopped payment on the check, and only then received a response
from the plaintiff's president who refused to make any repairs to
the vehicle and demanded immediate payment.
120).

(Record at 117 -

As a result, the Hills returned the keys to the plaintiff.

(Record at 117).

The facts set forth above are all contained in the
Record as part of the defendant's answers to the plaintiff's
Interrogatories or in the Affidavit of Diane S. Hill.

These

facts are all admissible, and under the standards of Rule 56 of
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, formed the foundation upon
which the Circuit Court based its decision.
2.

The "Facts" Which are Illusory or
Otherwise Improperly "Asserted by the
Plaintiff

Several of the "facts" set forth in the plaintiff's statement of the case and throughout the plaintiff's brief are
illusory, are not supported by sworn statements, are not
admissible, or are otherwise improper under Rule 56. Because
these "facts" are critical to the disposition of this appeal,
issue is taken with each of these below.
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In the first paragraph of the plaintiff's Statement of
the Case, (Plaintiff at 2), and throughout its brief (e.g./
Plaintiff at 6), the plaintiff alleges that Mr. Hill purchased
the vehicle on as "As Is" basis and "signed his agreement to such
a statement (attached as Exhibit B) and accepted delivery of the
automobile."

(Record at 16). In Mr.

Hill's answers to the

plaintiff's Requests for Admissions No. 2, Mr. Hill admitted only
that the signature on the alleged Buyer's Guide appeared to be
his, and denied the remaining allegations of the Request for the
reason that he was not certain that the Buyer's Guide was
complete at the time of the sale.

(Record at 84). Based upon

the record, the most that could be said is that an incomplete
Buyer's Guide contained what appeared to be the defendant's
signature.
In the second paragraph of its Statement of the Case
(Plaintiff at 2-3)/ the plaintiff alleges that upon speaking with
Mrs. Hill regarding the breakdown, the plaintiff's secretary/
Stacy Dixonf advised Mrs. Hill that there were "three examples"
of what might be done to the vehicle.

The record/ however, con-

tains no affidavit or sworn statement to support what she allegedly said.

A review of the Plaintiff's Answers to the

Defendant's Interrogatories contained in the Record at Pages 21
through 32, shows only that Mr. Jim Skeltonf the office manager
of the plaintiff, prepared and verified the Plaintiff's Answers
to the Defendant's Interrogatories.
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Therefore, Mr. Hill objects

to the statements allegedly attributable to Stacy Dixon since
they are hearsay, and as such are inadmissible and form an
inappropriate basis to support the plaintiff's objection to a
Motion for Summary Judgment.
In the third paragraph of the Statement of the Case,
(Plaintiff at 3), the plaintiff alleges that in a telephone
conversation between the plaintiff's president, Sarkas Barakat
and Mrs. Hill, Mrs. Hill was reminded that the automobile was
sold "As Is" and that Mr.

Hill had been informed that she was

responsible for any defects in the vehicle.

With respect to this

allegation, the Record is completey devoid of any sworn statement
of Mr. Barakat relative to his conversation with Mrs. Hill or
with any other individual, and any such statement, if made, was
hearsay, and is inadmissible.

Therefore, this allegation is

improperly presented as part of the plaintiff's brief.
In the plaintiff's Summary of the Argument (Plaintiff
at 2-5) and throughout the text of the plaintiff's argument, the
plaintiff continually alleges that Mr. Hill had "the opportunity
to inspect and test drive the vehicle over a two day period."
(Record at 4, 9, 12 - 13, 16 and 17). This allegation is untrue
and should not be considered for the reason that Mr. Hill resides
in Delta, Utah.

There is no evidence whatsoever before the Court

that Mr. Hill was able to perform a further examination of the
vehicle during the two-day period between the time when he test
drove the car and returned to Orem to take delivery.
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Under clear standards of Utah law, in an appeal from an
Order granting a Motion for Summary Judgment, the party moved
against may not set forth additional facts or allegations which
not presented by Affidavit or otherwise proper under Rule 56 of
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

Therefore, the plaintiff1s

reliance upon facts which are inadmissible or otherwise improper
under Rule 56, and which are not supported in the Record, are not
properly before the Court, and provide no support for the plaintiff's arguments.
By virtue of the vehicle's failure to conform to the
contract, Mr. Hill made a timely and effective rejection of the
delivery of the vehicle, and if the Court finds that he had
accepted the vehicle, he made a timely and effective revocation
of his acceptance based upon the non-conformity which substantially impaired the value of the automobile to Mr. Hill.
The December 19, 1985, contract whereunder Mr. Hill
agreed to buy a 1981 VW Rabbit Diesel from the plaintiff was
voidable under the doctrine of failure of consideration for the
reason that Mr. Hill gave full performance of his obligation
under the contract, and the plaintiff failed to tender his
performance by its delivery of an inoperative automobile.
The plaintiff's exclusions of the implied warranty of
merchantability were unenforceable against Mr. Hill for the
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reason that they were so grossly oppressive and one sided as to
render the disclaimers unconscionable.

As a result of the unen-

forceability of these provisions/ the parties1 agreement was
clothed with the implied warranty of merchantability under the
Uniform Commercial Code,

and due to the latent defect in the

automobile/ this warranty was breached.

Mr, Hill wasf therefore/

entitled to cancel the contract.
ARGUMENT
In its Brief on Appeal/ the plaintiff has assailed each
of the theories under which the Circuit Court granted Mr. Hill's
Motion for Summary Judgment.

Sucinctly, the Circuit Court found

in favor of Mr. Hill for the following reasons:

Mr. Hill

rejected the plaintiff's tender of the automobile after discovering its non-conformity/ or if Mr. Hill "accepted" the automobile/ he duly revoked his acceptance (U.C.A. §§ 70A-2-601/
70A-2-608); the contract was duly avoided by Mr. Hill for failure
of consideration; andf finally/ the disclaimer of warranties was
unconscionable (U.C.A. § 70A-2-302).

As a result/ Mr.

Hill was

entitled to cancel the contract based upon the plaintiff's breach
of the implied warranty of merchantability.
70A-2-314).
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(U.S.A. 5

POINT I
THE FACTS BEFORE THE COURT ARE LIMITED TO THOSE
WHICH WERE PROPERLY SUBMITTED TO THE CIRCUIT COURT.
As pointed out in the Statement of the Case, the plaintiff failed to file any sworn submissions to dispute the allegations of the Affidavit of Diane S. Hill, and the only sworn
submissions of the plaintiff consisted of its answers to the
Defendant's First Set of Interrogatories.

(Record at 21-32).

Under the law of the State of Utah, while the Court is to view
the facts in a summary judgment in a light most favorable to the
party moved against, Webster v. Sill, 675 P.2d 1170 (Utah 1983),
if the opposing party fails to file affidavits controverting
those of the movant, the facts set forth in the movant's affidavits and other sworn submissions are deemed admitted.

Under this

circumstance, the party moved against is bound by the movant's
affidavits and has waived the right to raise other "facts" on
appeal in a belated effort to create genuine issues of material
fact.

Strange v. Ostlund, 594 P.2d 877 (Utah 1979), Franklin

Financial v. New Empire Development Company, 659 P.2d 1040 (Utah
1983).

In addition, any submissions in opposition to a motion

for summary judgment must set forth facts that would be
admissible into evidence.
1983).

Norton v. Blackham, 669 P.2d 857 (Utah

Therefore, by the plaintiff's failure to submit affida-

vits at the time of the hearing, it waived its right to controvert the Affidavit of Mrs. Hill and the other sworn statements of
the defendant, and the hearsay statements attributable to Sarkas
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Barakat, Jeff Lush and Stacy Dixon, if they were material, are
not properly before this Court and may not be relied upon by the
plaintiff to support its position.

POINT II
THE DEFENDANT MADE A TIMELY AND EFFECTIVE REJECTION
OF THE AUTOMOBILE.
Under the Utah Uniform Commercial Code, if goods or a
tender of delivery fail in any respect to conform to the
contract, and if the buyer does not accept the goods, he may
reject them.
A.

(U.C.A. § 70A-2-601, 70A-2-607, 1953, as amended)
The Automobile Failed to Conform to the Contract

Section 2-106(2) of the Uniform Commercial Code states
that:
"Goods or conduct, including any part of a performance,
are 'conforming' or conform to the contract when they
are in accordance with the obligations under the
contract."
In this case, the plaintiff agreed to sell Mr. Hill a used 1981
Volkswagen Rabbit.

Based upon Mr. Hill's examination of the

vehicle, his test drive, and the seller's representation that is
was a "good car" and much better than the other vehicle Mr. Hill
had looked at (Record at 76), the agreement for purchase implied
that the automobile would function for a reasonable period of
time as it did at the time of the test drive and inspection.
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In

fact, the automobile was not operative and failed to conform, in
that respect, to the contract.
In its Brief on Appeal, the plaintiff asserts that, in
essence, the alleged "As Is" clause of the contract eliminated
any responsibility of the seller as to the condition of the automobile.

The commentary to Section 2-313 (Express Warranties) of

the Uniform Commercial Code discusses the foundation of the law
of warranties stating that its "whole purpose . . . is to determine what it is that the seller has agreed to sell . . . ." The
commentary goes on to state that "a contract is normally a
contract for a sale of something describable and described . . ."
and that

"[a] clause generally disclaiming 'all warranties
express or implied' cannot reduce a seller's obligation
with respect to such description and, therefore, cannot
be given literal effect under 2-31S." (Exclusion and
modification of warranties)
In support of this position, the plaintiff cites cases
from the states of Oregon and Kansas which it claims stand for
the proposition that when goods are sold "As Is" they conform to
the contract regardless to how illusory or oppressive the result.
(Plaintiff's Brief at 6).
cases is improper.

The plaintiff's reliance upon these

In Clark v. Ford Motor Company, 46 Or. App.

521, 612 P.2d 316 (1984), the Court was faced with a factual pattern clearly distinguishable from that of the present case. In
Clark, the purchaser had purchased a new vehicle from a dealer.
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The manufacturer had given the purchaser an express warrantyf and
the seller disclaimed all warranties/ express or implied. A
reading of the case indicates that the Oregon Court made its
decision on a factual pattern vastly different from the present
casef and did not rule "that a used car sold 'as is' cannot be
found to be conforming 'by definition' because the buyer received
exactly what he bargained for" as claimed in the plaintiff's
Brief.

(Plaintiff's Brief at 6). Moreover, the Court specifi-

cally noted that there was no issue raised by the plaintiff as to
the effectiveness of the disclaimer and declined to make any
judgment as to its effectiveness.

612 P.2d at 319, Note 5.

The plaintiff also relies upon the case of International
Petroleum Services, Inc. v. S and N Well Service, Inc., 230 Kan.
452, 639 P.2d 29 (1982).

In that case, the specific issue before

the Court was whether the implied warranties of the Uniform
Commercial Code applied to the sale of used goods.

The Court

held that these warranties may arise in the context of the sale
of used goods, but stated that there may be situations where the
warranties do not arise, including when the warranties are
disclaimed and the goods offered for sale "as is" or "with all
faults."

539 P.2d at 34. However, the Court specifically noted

that the requirements of the disclaimer statute must be met and
that the limitation must also meet the standards of the Kansas
Consumer Protection Act KSA Section 50-639(c)(d), which allows a
seller to disclaim such warranties only if he is able to
establish that the buyer had knowledge of the defects.
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In all fairness, the Clark and International Petroleum
cases are inapposite when viewed in light o$ the facts of this
case.

Their facts are clearly distinguishable as are the rights

and remedies of the buyers in those cases. As a result, these
cases fail to compel the conclusion sought by the plaintiff and
provide no support for its appeal.
The better approach to the problem of non-conformity and
disclaimers of warranties was taken in the case of Blankenship v.
Northtown Ford, Inc., 95 111. App. 3d 303, 420 N.E.2d 167 (1981),
where the Court held that a dealer would not be allowed to avoid
a buyer's cancellation of a contract by virtue of its technical
compliance with Section 2-316 of the Uniforin Commercial Code.
The Court rejected what it called the "logical extension" of the
dealer's argument which was, in essence, that by disclaiming
warranties, a purchaser's cancellation would be barred in the
event that the seller sold a car that turneid out not to have an
engine.

420 N.E.2d at 171.

Because of the substantial defect which caused the automobile to break down and become inoperative, the vehicle failed
to conform to the contract and Mr.

Hill w^s entitled to his

right to reject the delivery, or if he had already given his
"acceptance" of the vehicle, to revoke his acceptance.
2-601, 2-608.
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U.C.A. §§

B.

The Defendant Never Accepted Delivery of the Rabbit

The mere act of taking possession does not constitute an
"acceptance" under the provisions of the Utah Commercial Code
because/ under the Code, a buyer is not deemed to have accepted
goods until he has had a reasonable opportunity to inspect them.
U.C.A. § 70A-2-606(l)(a).
The case of Shelton v. Farkas, 30 Wash. App. 549, 635
P.2d 1109 (1981) presents a factual pattern which is nearly identical to that of this case.

In Shelton, the defendant went to

the plaintiff's place of business for the purpose of purchasing a
violin.

The seller represented that the violin was of good

quality, and that the price was discounted because the buyer was
"willing to take it on an fas is1 basis."

635 P.2d at 1111. Two

days after the purchase, the defendant presented the violin to
her instructor, who immediately informed her that it had a poor
tone, that it had a crack in the body and was not the right
instrument for her.

When the seller refused to refund the defen-

dant's money, she stopped payment on the check.

At the trial of

the action, the Court found in favor of the defendant, and the
seller appealed.
On appeal, the Washington Court of Appeals affirmed the
trial court and rejected the seller's contention that the "as is"
clause of the contract precluded the buyer's right to reasonably
inspect the goods prior to acceptance or to revoke after accep-
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tance, noting that the use of an "as is" expression is relevant
only to exclusion or modification of warranties.

Citing the

White and Summers Treatise on the Uniform Commercial Code, the
Court went on to note that the passing of title is unrelated to
whether a buyer has accepted goods (See Commentary to Uniform
Commercial Code § 2-606, Comment No. 2 ) , antf that "in the usual
case, the buyer will have had possession of the goods for some
time before he has 'accepted them111.

Finally, following the

requirements of § 2-606 of the Uniform Commercial Code, the Court
held that "acceptance" of goods occurs only after the buyer has
had a reasonable opportunity to inspect them and signifies to the
seller that they are conforming or that he ^ill retain them in
spite of their non-conformity.

635 P.2d at 1113. Based on this

analysis, the Court ruled that under the facts of the case, a
two-day period to accept was within a reasonable time to do so.

In Zabrieski Chevrolet, Inc. v. Smith, 99 N.J. Super.
441, 5 UCCRS 30, 240 A.2d 195 (1968), a case dealing with a
defective automobile, the Court recognized that the purchaser
does not accept goods until he has had "a reasonable opportunity
to inspect them."

The Court went on to hold that the proverbial

"spin around the block does not provide a reasonable opportunity
to inspect, and further stated that the seller's contentions in
this regard were illusory and unrealistic."

5 UCCRS at 38.

In the case at bar, Mr. Hill performed the ritualistic
spin around the block and then two days later took possession of
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the Rabbit.

After traveling approximately 50 miles, the car had

broken down and was completely inoperative.

Under the standards

identified above, when the car broke down within two hours after
its delivery, Mr.

Hill was still within the ambit of "the reaso-

nable opportunity to inspect."

Therefore, acceptance cannot be

deemed to have occurred, and Mr. Hill was entitled to reject the
tender of the vehicle.
Throughout its Brief, the plaintiff refers to an alleged
two-day period within which Mr. Hill could have inspected the
vehicle.

The plaintiff's allegation in this regard is illusory

and distorted for the reason that, as stated in the Statement of
the Case, at the time of the purchase, Mr. Hill was a resident of
Delta, Utah, and after his initial test drive of the vehicle, he
returned to his home in Delta.

Therefore, any allegations of the

plaintiff relative to Mr. Hill's "two-day opportunity to inspect"
are misleading, not supported by the Record, and form an insufficient basis for the plaintiff's contentions.
C.

The Defendant Seasonably Notified the Plaintiff of
the Rejection and Effectively Cancelled the Contract

Under Section 2-601 of the Uniform Commercial Code, a
buyer can reject a delivery of goods "if the goods fail in any
respect to conform to the contract."

As shown above, the automo-

bile failed to conform to the contract and at the time of the
breakdown Mr. Hill had not yet had a reasonable opportunity to
inspect the vehicle.
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Section 70A-2-602 of the Utah Uniform Commercial Code
states that "rejection of goods must be within a reasonable time
after their delivery or tender" and that rejection "is ineffective unless the buyer seasonably notifies the seller•"

Although

what constitutes a reasonable time for rejection is considered a
question of fact to be determined from the circumstances of the
case, Christopher v. Larsen Ford Sales, Inc., 557 P.2d 1009, 1012
(Utah 1976), it is undisputed that the Hills notified the plaintiff of the defect almost immediately after the car broke down.
(Record at 117)• It is further undisputed that the Hills
attempted several other communications with the plaintiff, that
for several days the plaintiff refused to return the Hills1
calls, and that after the Hills had stopped payment on the check,
the plaintiff refused to repair the car.

(Record at 117). It is

also undisputed that after the plaintiff refused to repair the
car, the Hills returned the keys to the plaintiff.
117).

(Record at

Under these facts, it is clear that the Hills simply could

not have given notice of their rejection ariy sooner than when
made.

Therefore, based upon these undisputed facts, the Hills

effectively rejected the delivery of the Rabbit and cancelled the
contract.

U.C.A. §§ 70A-2-602, 70A-2-711.
POINT III
IF DELIVERY WAS ACCEPTED, MR. HILL EFFECTIVELY
REVOKED HIS ACCEPTANCE OF THE RABBIT.

Even if Mr. Hill "accepted" the automobile, he "revoked"
his acceptance.

See U.C.A. § 70A-2-608. Under Section
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70A-2-608(1)(b) of the Utah Uniform Commercial Code, a buyer may
revoke his acceptance of goods whose non-conformity substantially
impairs its value to him if he has accepted the goods without
discovery of the non-conformity and his acceptance was reasonably
induced by the difficulty of discovery before acceptance.

See

Ford Motor Credit Company v. Harper, 671 F.2d 1117 (8th Cir.
1982) .
A.

The Rabbit1s Non-conformity Substantially Impaired
its Value jto Mr^ Hill

The non-conformity of the vehicle is established by
Hill's uncontroverted affidavit.

Therefore, the initial inquiry

on the issue of revocation of acceptance is whether the nonconformity substantially impaired the value of the vehicle to Mr.
Hill.

In analyzing the issue of impairment of value, the Court

looks to the effect of the impairment on the particular buyer,
and most Courts have agreed that while the test is subjective,
the issue is best resolved by looking at the objective evidence
available to the Court rather than on the personal belief of the
buyer.

Aubrey's RV Center v. Tandy Corp., 46 Wash. App.

731 P.2d 1124, 1128 (1987) and Fargo Machine and Tool
v. Carney and Trecker, 428 F. Supp. 364, 379 (East.
1977).

595,

Company
Dist. Mich.

It has also been stated that "the test for substantial

impairment is . . . at bottom a common sense perception."

Ford

Motor Credit Company v. Harper, 671 F.2d at 1124. Common sense
compels the conclusion that the 1981 Rabbit was purchased for the
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purpose of providing transportation to Mr.

Hill, and that when

it broke down and would not move forward or backward, and the
plaintiff refused responsibility for any repairs, any anticipated value the vehicle may have had to Mr. Hill was completely
destroyed.
The plaintiff raises arguments that the value of the
vehicle is not substantially impaired to Mr. Hill.
Brief at 11-12).

(Plaintiff's

First, the plaintiff argues that Mr. Hill

should have expected to make repairs to the vehicle regardless of
when they became necessary.

Second, the plaintiff assumes that

the vehicle could have been repaired, and argues that Mr. Hill
had an obligation to show that the car could not have been
repaired.
These arguments simply beg the question of whether, in
light of the facts before the court, a finding of substantial
impairment of value was supportable.

The undisputed and only

facts before the Court show that the automobile broke down and
would not move forward and backward (Record at 79), that Mr.
Hillfs wife contacted the plaintiff and was assured that the
plaintiff would tow the car back to its lot (Record at 117), that
the car was never recovered by the plaintiff (Record at 80), and
that the plaintiff refused to make any repairs or inspection.
These facts compel the conclusion that the value of the vehicle
to the defendant was substantially impaired.
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Presumably, the car

was sold for storage fees and the nature and extent of the break
down will never be determined.

Under the facts set forth abovef

the Hills were entitled to rely upon the plaintiff's representations that it would tow the car back to its lot, and inasmuch
as the plaintiff failed to do so, any common sense perception of
Mr.

Hillfs description of the breakdown compels the conclusion

that the value of the vehicle to Mr. Hill was destroyed.

B.

The Defect was Latent

It is undisputed that Mr. Hill accepted the Rabbit
without knowledge of the non-conformity, and it is axomatic his
acceptance was induced by the difficulty of its discovery.

The

latent nature of the carfs defect prevented its discovery until
Mr.

Hill had driven the car approximately 50 miles.

Certainly,

any reasonable person would not have purchased such a vehicle
having knowledge of that defect.
C.

The Defendant Gave Timely Notice of Revocation

Timeliness of a notice of revocation of acceptance, as
with notice of rejection, should be determined from the circumstances of the case.
supra.

Christopher v. Larsen Ford Sales, Inc.,

The official comment to Section 2-608 of the Uniform

Commercial Code states that notice of revocation of acceptance
should be made "within a reasonable time after discovery of the
grounds for such revocation."

The commentary goes on to state
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that "this reasonable time period should extend in most cases
beyond the time in which notification of breach must be givenf
beyond the time of discovery of non-conformity after acceptance/
and beyond the time for rejection after tender."

Official com-

mentary to Uniform Commercial Code Section 2-608/ No. 4.
As stated above, the defendant gave notice of revocation
immediately after the defect was discovered.

Subsequently/ there

were several telephone calls placed to the plaintiff's place of
business, a telephone call between Mrs. Hill and Mr. Barakat/ and
finally a letter from Mrs. Hill to the plaintiff in which the
keys to the Rabbit were returned to the plaintiff.
119-120).

(Record at

Under the circumstances/ all of which are supported by

the Affidavit of Diane S. Hill and uncontroverted as well as by
the defendant's answers to the plaintiff's Interrogatories/ the
revocation was timely within the meaning of Section 70A-2-608.
Therefore/ based upon the timely notice of a non-conformity with
the contract which substantially impaired the value of the
vehicle to Mr. Hill/ Mr. Hill effectively cancelled the contract
and the decision of the Circuit Court should be affirmed.
POINT IV
THE CONTRACT IS VOIDABLE FOR FAILURE OF
CONSIDERATION.
The consideration for the December 19f 1985/ contract
was the delivery of a 1981 VW Rabbit Diesel which would provide
adequate transportation for a reasonable time. Because of the
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defect in the automobile/ the contract is subject to rescission
based on the doctrine of failure of consideration.
In reference to the defense of failure of consideration/
the Utah Supreme Court has stated that the defense "exists
wherever one who has either given or has promised to give some
performance fails, without his fault/ to receive in some material
respect the agreed exchange for that performance."

Bentley v.

Potter/ 694 P.2d 617 (Utah 1984)/ citing Williston, Law of
Contracts/ Section 814 at 17-78 (3rd ed. 1962).
this case clearly fit this definition.

The facts in

By tendering his check to

the plaintiff/ Mr. Hill gave his performance/ and due to no fault
of his ownf received an automobile that proved totally defective
and inoperable.

Simply put/ Mr. Hill did not receive what he

bargained for.

The plaintiff argues that by virtue of the alleged "as
is" salef the contract for sale was supported by adequate consideration.

In support of this position/ the plaintiff cites the

case of Yanish v. Fernandez/ 156 Colo. 255/ 397 P.2d 881 (1965).
The plaintiff claims that the Yanish case stands for the proposition/ in effect/ that any "as is" contract for the sale of goods,
no matter how illusory or one-sided/ is supported by adequate
consideration.

Yanish makes no such claim/ but rather is based

upon warranty theories and makes no ruling whatsoever that "as
is" contracts aref as a matter of lawf supported by con-
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sideration.

The undisputed facts before the Court compel one

conclusion:

Mr. Hill did not receive what he bargained for and

was promised, that the contract failed for lack of consideration,
and that the judgment of the Circuit Court should be affirmed.
POINT V
THE PLAINTIFFfS EXCLUSIONS OF IMPLIED WARRANTIES ARE
INEFFECTIVE FOR THE REASON THAT THEY ARE
UNCONSCIONABLE.
Under the Uniform Commercial Code express and implied
warranties may be excluded by meeting certain requirements. See
U.C.A. § 70A-2-316. However, as with all contract provisions,
disclaimers of warranties are unenforceable if they are
unconscionable.

A.

See § 70A-2-302. See also 15 U.S.C. § 2308(b).

Plaintiff1s Exclusions of Warranty are
Unconscionable and Hence, Unenforceable

In cases with facts almost identical to the case at bar,
Courts of other jurisdictions have found exclusionary language
such as that in this case unconscionable.

For example, in

Industralease v. RME Enterprises, 396 N.Y.S.2d 427 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1977) the respondent leased equipment from the appellant
which, once installed, never worked.

The lease contained

language disclaiming all express and implied warranties. The
issue before the Court was whether the disclaimers were
unconscionable under circumstances where the equipment never
operated.

The Court stated that "although the statute prescribes
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that we are to determine unconscionability as of the time of the
making of the contract/ we cannot divorce entirely the events
which occurred later."

396 N.Y.S. at 432. After finding that

the equipment did not work at all and did not achieve any of the
purposes intended by the parties, the Court held that the result
was "so one-sided . . . that the disclaimer in good conscience
should not be enforced . . . " and that "the disclaimer of warranties is unconscionable under the circumstances and should not be
enforced."

Id.

Other cases reaching the same conclusion on

similar facts are Safarti v. M A Hittner & Sons, Inc., 318
N.Y.S.2d 352 (N.Y. App. Div. 1970); Eckstein v. Cummins, 321
N.E.2d 897 (Ohio App. 1974); and LaVere v. R.M. Burritt Motors,
Inc., 446 N.Y.S.2d 851 (City Ct. N.Y. 1982).
In the case of Resource Management Corporation v.
Western Ranch & Livestock Company, Inc., 706 P.2d 1028 (Utah
1985) , the Utah Supreme Court discussed the doctrine of
unconscionability.

The Court identified at least three standards

by which unconscionability is tested:
1.

Whether in light of the general commercial

background and the general commercial needs of the particular trade or case, the clauses are so one-sided as
to be unconscionable under the circumstances existing at
the time of the making of the contract . . .

. The

principal is one of the prevention of oppression and
unfair surprise.

Official comment to U.S.C. § 2-302.
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2.

Whether the clause or contract is one that fno

decent fair-minded person would view without being
possessed of a profound sense of injustice.1

Carlson v.

Hamilton, 275 P.2d 989, 8 Utah 2d 272 (1958).
3.

Whether the contract shows an overall imbalance in

the obligations and rights imposed by the bargain.
Bekins Bar-V Ranch v. Huth, 664 P.2d 455 (Utah 1983).
The Court also recognized the rule that while unconscionability
is generally determined at the time the contract is made, a Court
may refuse to enforce a contract where subsequent events turn out
to be such as were not within the reasonable contemplation of the
parties at the time the contract was entered.

706 P.2d at

1045-46, citing Link v. Wirtz, 638 P.2d 985, 986 (Kan. 1982).
This case presents a factual pattern that falls clearly
within the parameters of each of the tests recognized by the Utah
Supreme Court.

Mr. Hill was most certainly surprised, and

unfairly so, when he discovered that the automobile he had
purchased from a reputable dealer, and had paid for minutes
earlier was inoperable.

Certainly no fair-minded person could

view enforcement of the contract as anything less than a sanction
of a transaction, which from its inception was entirely out of
balance and imposed upon Mr. Hill a total forfeiture of the
bargain he anticipated.

Finally, the oppressive result of the

disclaimer serves only to promote unfair surprise, making the
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contract wholly one-sided/ with the plaintiff receiving over
$2/500.00/ and Mr. Hill receiving an inoperable and worthless
vehicle.
While giving lip service to the policy of preventing
opression and unfair surprise/ the plaintiff makes much ado about
the policy of not disturbing the allocation of risks allegedly
contemplated by the contract/ and again argues that Mr. Hill "had
two days to bargain forf inspect and accept the automobile and
should not have been surprised by the "as is" contract."
(Plaintiff at 14-18).

As pointed out above, this "two-day" argu-

ment is completely misleading.

While Mr. Hill may not have been

"surprised" at the nature of the contract/ like any other
purchaser of an automobile from a reputable dealer, he was most
certainly surprised/ and unfairly sof when the car broke down
minutes after leaving the plaintiff's lot and when the dealer
refused any assistance of any kind.
The plaintiff goes on to assert that the "Buyer's Guide"
required by the Federal Trade Commission "was developed . . . to
better establish buyer and seller responsibilities."

While this

may be the result desired by automobile dealers, it most certainly was not the reason for the development of the Buyer's
Guide.

Rather, due to the unscrupulous sales activities of

dealers of used automobiles who would make oral representations
of quality and warranty only to disclaim them in the sales
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contract, the FTC promulgated the regulation requiring the
Buyer's Guide in order to prevent these "unfair and deceptive
acts or practices . . •

."

16 C.F.R. § 455(a)(b)and(c).

The obvious intent of this regulation is to protect the consumer,
and interestingly, the plaintiff now attempts to use the regulation as a sword, forcing Mr. Hill into an entirely one-sided
bargain, which no reasonable person would view without seeing its
injustice.

The federal regulation, in any event, should not

supplant the applicable provisions of Utah law cited in this
Brief.
In its final argument, the plaintiff points out that the
UCC requires that the parties "be afforded a reasonable opportunity to present evidence" as to the commercial setting of the
contract.

UCA 70A-2-302(2).

This, the plaintiff argues, is

reversable error.
This argument call for two responses.

First, the tran-

saction in question is one with which nearly all adults in our
society are familiar, and its commercial setting is one of which
a court may take judicial notice.

Second, and perhaps finally

arriving at the crux of the reason for this appeal, under the
U.C.C. the plaintiff is entitled only to a "reasonable" opportunity to present evidence. As stated at the initiation of this
Brief, in a Motion for Summary Judgment, the party moved against
has the obligation to submit affidavits or other sworn sub-
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missions which raise genuine issues of material fact.

When the

party fails to do so, he is deemed to have admitted the facts
asserted by the movant, and has waived his right to contest those
facts.

Franklin Financial, supra.

Moreover, since the plaintiff

has failed to file opposing affidavits, the Court may assume that
no material facts exist which would counter those submitted by
the defendant.

The plaintiff waived its right to raise addi-

tional facts on the issue of unconscionability, and inasmuch as
the facts before the Court show a bargain so oppressive and onesided that any fair-minded person would be affected with a profound sense of injustice, the decision of the Circuit Court
should be affirmed and this appeal dismissed.

B.

The Plaintiff Breached the Implied Warranty of
Merchantability

The language attempting to exclude all express and
implied warranties is unconscionable and hence, unenforceable.
Therefore, at minimum, the transaction is clothed with implied
warranties of merchantability and fitness for purpose.

Under the

provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, for goods to be
merchantable they must be fit for the ordinary purposes for which
such goods are used.

In Testo v. Russ Dunmire Oldsmobile, Inc.,

554 P.2d 349 (Wash. App.

1976), the Court addressed the question

of merchantability and used automobiles.

Referring to the com-

mentary to § 2-314 of the U.C.C., the Court stated that "The
measure of a used car's merchantability turns . . .
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on its

operative qualities," 554 P.2d at 354f and went on to state that
"[to] be fit for the purpose of driving, a four-year old automobile • . must be in reasonably safe condition and substantially
free of defects which render it inoperable."

Id.

Under facts

showing substantial defects in the car, the Court held that since
the car did not meet this standard it was not "merchantable"
within the meaning of § 2-314 of the U.C.C.
Applying this test to the present case, it is clear that
the vehicle sold by the plaintiff was not merchantable because, as
in the Testo case, after only a short period of time, the car
would not operate due to latent defects.

Therefore, Mr. Hill is

entitled to his remedies under the Code, including cancellation
of the contract.

U.C.A. § 70A-2-711.
CONCLUSION

At the time Mr. Hill's Motion for Summary Judgment was
heard by the Circuit Court, the facts before the Court were
undisputed.

Those same facts are before this Court in the Record

on Appeal and the plaintiff cannot now belatedly present additional facts not supported by the Record.

The contract for the

purchase of the automobile was cancelled by Mr. Hill due to his
rejection of its delivery, or his revocation of its acceptance.
Moreover, the contract was voidable under the doctrine of failure
of consideration.

Finally, by virtue of the contract's

unconscionability, the contract should be clothed with the
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implied warranty of merchantability/ the breach of which entitled
Mr. Hill to cancel the contract.
Any of the theories of relief set forth above is sufficient to affirm the judgment of the Eighth Circuit Court.
DATED this £&>

day of October, 1987.
MAZURAN, VERHAAREN & HAYES, P.C.
Attorneys for Charles P. Hill
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ADDENDUM

§ 2—106,

Definitions: "Contract"; "Agreement"; "Cont r a c t for Sale"; "Sale"; "Present Sale"; "Conforming" t o Contract; "Termination"; "Cancellation"
(1) In this Article unless the context otherwise requires
"contract" and "agreement" are limited to those relating to the
present or future sale of goods. "Contract for sale" includes
both a present sale of goods and a contract to sell goods at a
future time. A "sale" consists in the passing of title from the
seller to the buyer for a price (Section 2—101). A "present
sale" means a sale which is accomplished by the making of the
contract.

(2) Goods or conduct including any part of a performance
are "conforming" or conform to the contract when they are in
accordance with the obligations under the contract.
(3) "Termination" occurs when either p a r t y pursuant to a
power created by agreement or law puts an end to the contract
otherwise t h a n for its breach. On "termination" all obligations
which are still executory on both sides a r e discharged but any
r i g h t based on prior breach or performance survives.
(4) "Cancellation" occurs when either p a r t y puts an end to
the contract for breach by the other and its effect is the same
as t h a t of "termination" except t h a t the cancelling party also
retains any remedy for breach of the whole contract or any
unperformed balance.
Official Comment
Prior Uniform Statutory Provision: Subsection (1)—Section 1
(1) and (2), Uniform Sales Act;
Subsection (2)—none, but subsection generally continues policy of Sections 11, 44 and 69, Uniform Sales Act; Subsections (3)
and (4)—none.
Changes: Completely rewritten.

of Section 2—508 on seller's cure
of improper tender or delivery.
Moreover usage of trade frequently permits commercial leeways in performance and the language of the agreement itself
must be read in the light of such
custom or usage and also, prior
course of dealing, and in a long
term contract, the course of performance.

Purposes of Changes and New
Matter:
1. Subsection ( 1 ) : "Contract
for sale" is used as a general concept throughout this Article, but
the rights of the parties do not
vary according to whether the
transaction is a present sale or a
contract to sell unless the Article
expressly so provides.

Cross References:
Point 2: Sections 1—203, 1—
205, 2—208 and 2—508.

2. Subsection ( 2 ) : It is in
general intended to continue the
policy of requiring exact performance by the seller of his obligations as a condition to his
right to require acceptance.
However, the seller is in part
safeguarded against surprise as
a result of sudden technicality on
the buyer's part by the provisions

Definitional Cross References:
"Agreement". Section 1—201.
"Buyer". Section 2—103.
"Contract". Section 1—201.
"Goods". Section 2—105.
"Party". Section 1—201.
"Remedy". Section 1—201.
"Rights". Section 1—201.
"Seller". Section 2—103.

3. Subsections (3) and (4):
These subsections are intended to
make clear the distinction carried
forward throughout this Article
between termination and cancellation.

§ 2—302.
Unconscionable Contract or Clause
(1) If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or anv
clause of the contract to have been unconscionable at the time
it was made the couit ma\ refuse to enforce the contract, or it
mav enforce the remainder of the contract without the unconscionable clause, or it mav so limit the application of any unconscionable clause as to avoid any unconscionable result.
(2) When it is claimed or appears to the court that the
contract or any clause thereof may be unconscionable the parties shall be afforded a reasonable opportunity to present evidence as to its commercial setting, purpose and effect to aid the
court in making the determination.
Official Comment
Prior Uniform Statutory Provision: None.
Purposes:
1. This section is intended to
make it possible for the courts to
police explicitly against the contracts or clauses which they find
to be unconscionable. In the
past such policing has been accomplished by adverse construction of language, by manipulation of the rules of offer and
acceptance or by determinations
that the clause is contrary to
public policy or to the dominant
purpose of the contract. This
section is intended to allow the
court to pass directly on the unconscionabihty of the contract
or particular clause therein and
to make a conclusion of law as
to its unconscionabihty
The
basic test is whether, in the
light of the general commercial
background and the commercial
needs of the particular trade or
case, the clauses involved are
so one-sided as to be unconscionable under the circumstances existing at the time of the making
of the contract. Subsection (2)
makes it clear that it is proper
for the court to hear evidence
upon these questions. The principle is one of the prevention of
oppression and unfair surprise
(Cf. Campbell Soup Co. v. Wentz,
172 F 2d 80, 3d Cir. 1948) and not
of disturbance of allocation of
risks because of superior bargaining power. The underlying

basis of this section is illustrated by the results in cases such
as the following:
Kansas City Wholesale Grocery Co. v. Weber Packing Corporation, 93 Utah 414, 73 P.2d
1272 (1937), where a clause limiting time for complaints was
held inapplicable to latent defects in a shipment of catsup
which could be discovered only
by microscopic analysis; Hardy
v. General Motors Acceptance
Corporation, 38 Ga App. 463, 144
S.E 327 (1928), holding that a
disclaimer of warranty clause
applied only to express warranties, thus letting in a fair implied warranty; Andrews Bros,
v. Singer & Co (1934 CA) 1 K B.
17, holding that where a car
with substantial mileage was delivered instead of a "new" car, a
disclaimer of warranties, including those "implied," left unaffected an "express obligation"
on the description, even though
the Sale of Goods Act called
such an implied warranty; New
Prague Flouring Mill Co v. G
A. Spears, 194 Iowa 417, 189
NW. 815 (1922), holding that a
clause permitting the seller, upon the buyer's failure to supply shipping instructions, to cancel, ship, or allow delivery date
to be indefinitely postponed 30
days at a time by the inaction,
does not indefinitely postpone
the date of measuring damages
for the buyer's breach, to the

SALES
seller's advantage; and Kansas
Flour Mills Co. v. Dirks, 100
Kan. 376, 164 P. 273 (1917),
where under a similar clause in
a rising market the court permitted the buyer to measure his
damages for non-delivery at the
end of only one 30 day postponement; Green v. Arco9, Ltd.
(1931 CA) 47 T.L.R. 336, where
a blanket clause prohibiting rejection of shipments by the buyer was restricted to apply to
shipments where discrepancies
represented merely mercantile
variations; Meyer v. Packard
Cleveland Motor Co., 106 Ohio
St. 328, 140 N.E. 118 (1922), in
which the court held that a
"waiver" of all agreements not
specified did not preclude implied warranty of fitness of a rebuilt dump truck for ordinary
use as a dump truckt Austin Co.
v. J. H. Tillman Co, 104 Or 541,
209 P. 131 (1922), where a
clause limiting the buyer's remedy to return was held to be applicable only if the seller had delivered a machine needed for a
construction job which reasonably met the contract description;
Bekke\old v. Potts, 173 Minn 87,
216 NW, 790, 59 A L R . 1164
(1927), refubing to allow warranty of fitness for purpose im-

§ 2-303

posed by law to be negated by
clause excluding all warranties
"made" by the seller; Robert A.
Munroe & Co. v. Meyer (1930) 2
K B / 3 1 2 , holding that the warranty of description overrides a
clause reading "with all faults
and defects" where adulterated
meat not up to the contract description was delivered.
2. Under this section the
couit, in its discretion, may refuse to enforce the contract as a
whole if it is permeated by the
unconscionabihty, or it may
strike any single clause or group
of clauses which are so tainted
or which are contrary to the essential purpose of the agreement,
or it may simply limit unconscionable clauses so as to avoid
unconscionable results.
3. The present section is addressed to the court, and the
decision is to be made by it. The
commercial evidence referred to
in subsection (2) is for the
court's consideration, not the jury's. Only the agreement which
results from the court's action
on these matters is to be submitted to the general triers of the
facts.
Definitional Cross Reference:
"Contract". Section 1—201.

§ 2—313.

Express Warranties by Affirmation, Promise, Description, Sample

(1) Express warranties by the seller are created as follows:
(a) Any affirmation of fact or promise made by the seller
to the buyer which relates to the goods and becomes
part of the basis of the bargain creates an express
warranty that the goods shall conforn) to the affirmation or promise.
(b) Any description of the goods which is made part of
the basis of the bargain creates an express warranty
that the goods shall conform to the description.
(c) Any sample or model which is made part of the basis
of the bargain creates an express warranty that the
whole of the goods shall conform to the sample or
model.
(2) It is not necessary to the creation of an express warranty that the seller use formal words such as "warrant" or
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§ 2—313
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"guarantee" or that he have a specific intention to make a
warranty, but an affirmation merely of the value of the goods
or a statement purporting to be merely the seller's opinion or
commendation of the goods does not create a warranty.
Official Comment
Prior Uniform Statutory Provision: Sections 12, 14 and 16,
Uniform Sales Act.
Changes:

Rewntten.

P u r p o s e s of C h a n g e s : To consolidate and systematize basic
principles with the result t h a t :
1. " E x p r e s s " w a r r a n t i e s rest
on "dickered" aspects of the
individual bargain, and go so
clearly to the essence of t h a t
bargain t h a t words of disclaime r in a form a r e r e p u g n a n t to
the basic dickered terms. "Implied" w a r r a n t i e s rest so clearly on a common factual situation
or set of conditions t h a t no particular language or action is
necessary to ewdence them and
they will arise in such a situation unless unmistakably negated.
This section reverts to the
older case law insofar as the
w a r r a n t i e s of d e s c i i p u o n and
sample are designated " e x p r e s s "
r a t h e r than "implied".
2. Although this section is
limited in its scope and direct
purpose to w a r r a n t i e s made by
the seller to the b u \ c r as part of
a contract for sale, the w a r r a n t y
sections of this Article are not
designed in any way to disturb
those lines of case law growth
which have recognized t h a t warr a n t i e s need not be confined eit h e r to sales c o n t r a c t s or to the
direct p a r t i e s to such a contract.
They may a r i s e in other appropriate c i r c u m s t a n c e s such as in

the case of bailments for hire,
w h e t h e r such bailment is itself
the main contract or is merely
a supplying of containers under
a contract for the sale of their
contents. The provisions of Section 2—318 on t h i r d p a r t y beneficiaries expressly recognize this
case law development within one
p a r t i c u l a r area.
Beyond that,
the m a t t e r is left to the case law
with the intention t h a t the policies of this Act may offer useful
guidance in dealing with f u r t h e r
cases as they arise.
3. The present section deals
with affirmations of fact by the
seller, descriptions of the goods
or exhibitions of samples, exactly as any other p a r t of a negotiation which ends in a contract
is dealt with. No specific intention to make a w a r r a n t y is necessary if any of these factors
is made part of the basis of the
bargain
In actual practice affirmations
of fact made by the
seller about the goods during a
bargain are regarded as p a r t of
the description of those goods,
hence no particular reliance on
such statements need be shown
in order to w e a \ e them into the
fabric of the agreement. Rather, any fact which is to take
such affirmations, once made,
out of the agreement requires
clear affirmative proof. The issue normally is one of fact.
4. In view of the principle
t h a t the whole purpose of the
law of w a r r a n t y is to determine
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what it is that the seller has in
essence agreed to sell, the policy
is adopted of those cases which
refuse except in unusual circumstances to recognize a material
deletion of the seller's obligation. Thus, a contract is normally a contract for a sale of
something describable and described. A clause generally disclaiming "all warranties, express or implied" cannot reduce
the seller's obligation with respect to such description and
therefore cannot be given literal
effect under Section 2—316.
This is not intended to mean
that the parties, if they consciously desire, cannot make
their own bargain as they wish.
But in determining what they
have agreed upon good faith is
a factor and consideration
should be given to the fact that
the probability is small that a
real price is intended to be exchanged for a pseudo-obligation.
5. Paragraph (1) (b) makes
specific some of the principles
set forth above when a description of the goods is given by the
seller.
A description need not be by
words. Technical specifications,
blueprints and the like can afford more exact description than
mere language and if made part
of the basis of the bargain goods
must conform with them. Past
deliveries may set the description of quality, either expressly
or impliedly by course of dealing. Of course, all descriptions
by merchants must be read
against the applicable trade usages with the general rules as
to merchantability resolving any
doubts.
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6. The basic situation as to
statements affecting the true essence of the bargain is no different when a sample or model is
involved in the transaction.
This section includes both a
"sample" actually drawn from
the bulk of goods which is the
subject matter of the sale, and a
"model" which is offered for inspection when the subject matter is not at hand and which has
not been drawn from the bulk
of the goods.
Although the underlying principles are unchanged, the facts
are often ambiguous when something is shown as illustrative,
rather than as a straight sample.
In general, the presumption is
that any sample or model just
as any affirmation of fact is intended to become a basis of the
bargain. But there is no escape
from the question of fact.
When the seller exhibits a sample purporting to be drawn from
an existing bulk, good faith of
course requires that the sample
be fairly drawn. But in mercantile experience the mere exhibition of a "sample" does not
of itself show whether it is
merely intended to "suggest" or
to "be" the character of the
subject-matter of the contract.
The question is whether the
seller has so acted with reference to the sample as to make
him responsible that the whole
shall have at least the values
shown by i t The circumstances
aid in answering this question.
If the sample has been drawn
from an existing bulk, it must
be regarded as describing values
of the goods contracted for un-.
less it is accompanied by an
unmistakable denial of such responsibility. If, on the other
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hand, a model of merchandise
not on hand is offered, the mercantile presumption that it has
become a literal description of
the subject matter is not so
strong, and particularly so if
modification on the buyer's initiative impairs any feature of the
model.
7. The precise time when
words of description or affirmation are made or samples are
shown is not material. The sole
question is whether the language or samples or models are
fairly to be regarded as part of
the contract. If language is
used after the closing of the deal
(as when the buyer when taking
delivery asks and receives an
additional assurance), the warranty becomes a modification,
and need not be supported by
consideration if it is otherwise
reasonable and in order (Section
2—209).
8. Concerning affirmations of
value or a seller's opinion or
commendation under subsection
(2), the basic question remains
the same: What statements of
the seller have in the circumstances and in objective judgment become part of the basis

of the bargain? As indicated
above, all of the statements of
the seller do so unless good reason is shown to the contrary.
The provisions of subsection (2)
are included, however, since
common experience discloses
that some statements or predictions cannot fairly be viewed as
entering into the bargain. Even
as to false statements of value,
however, the possibility is left
open that a remedy may be provided by the law relating to
fraud or misrepresentation.
Cross References:
Point 1: Section 2—316.
Point 2: Sections 1—102(3)
and 2—318.
Point 3 : Section 2—316(2)
(b).
Point 4: Section 2—316.
Point 5: Sections 1—205(4)
and 2—314.
Point 6: Section 2—316.
Point 7: Section 2—209.
Point 8: Section 1—103.
Definitional Cross References:
"Buyer". Section 2—103.
"Conforming".
Section 2—
106.
"Goods". Section 2—105.
"Seller". Section 2—103.

§ 2—314.

Implied Warranty: Merchantability; Usage of
Trade
(1) Unless excluded or modified (Section 2—316), a warr a n t y t h a t the goods shall be merchantable is implied in a
contract for their sale if the seller is a merchant with respect
to goods of that kind. Under this section the serving for
value of food or drink to be consumed either on the premises
or elsewhere is a sale.
(2) Goods to be merchantable must be at least such as
(a) pass without objection in the trade under the contract
description; and
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(b) in the case of fungible goods, are of fair average
quality within the description; and
(c) are fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods
are used; and
(d) run, within the variations permitted by the agreement, of even kind, quality and quantity within each
unit and among all units involved; and
(e) are adequately contained, packaged, and labeled as the
agreement may require; and
(f) conform to the promises or affirmations of fact made
on the container or label if any.
(3) Unless excluded or modified (Section 2—316) other implied warranties may arise from course of dealing or usage
of trade.
Official Comment
Prior Uniform Statutory Providesignation of the goods used
sion: Section 15(2), Uniform
in the agreement. The responsiSales Act.
bility imposed rests on any merchant-seller, arjd the absence of
Changes: Completely rewritten.
the words "grower or manufacturer
or not" which appeared in
Purposes of Changes: This secSection
15(2) of the Uniform
tion, drawn in view of the steadSales
Act
does not restrict the
ily developing case law on the
applicability
of this section.
subject, is intended to make it
clear that:
3. A specific designation of
goods
by the buyer does not ex1. The seller's obligation apclude
the
sellers obligation that
plies to present sales as well as
they be fit for the general purto contracts to sell subject to
poses appropriate to such goods.
the effects of any examination
A contract for| the sale of secof specific goods. (Subsection
ond-hand goods, however, in(2) of Section 2—316). Also,
volves only such obligation as
the warranty of merchantability
is appropriate to such goods for
applies to sales for use as well
that
is their contract descripas to sales for resale.
tion. A person making an isolated sale of goods is not a "mer2. The question when the
chant" within the meaning of
warranty is imposed turns basthe full scop^ of this section
ically on the meaning of the
and, thus, no warranty of merterms of the agreement as recogchantability wfould apply. His
nized in the trade. Goods deknowledge of any defects not
livered under an agreement
apparent on inspection would,
made by a merchant in a given
however, without need for exline of trade must be of a qualipress agreement and in keeping
ty comparable to that generally
with the underlying reason of
acceptable in that line of trade
the present section and the prounder the description or other
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visions on good faith, impose an
obligation that known material
but hidden defects be fully disclosed.
4. Although a seller may not
be a "merchant" as to the goods
in question, if he states generally that they are "guaranteed"
the provisions of this section
may furnish a guide to the content of the resulting express
warranty. This has particular
significance in the case of second-hand sales, and has further
significance in limiting the effect of fine-print disclaimer
clauses where their effect would
be inconsistent with large-print
assertions of "guarantee".
5. The second sentence of
subsection (1) covers the warranty with respect to food and
drink. Serving food or drink
for value is a sale, whether to be
consumed on the premises or
elsewhere. Cases to the contrary are rejected. The principal warranty is that stated in
subsections (1) and (2) (c) of
this section.
6. Subsection (2) does not
purport to exhaust the meaning
of "merchantable" nor to negate
any of its attributes not specifically mentioned in the text of
the statute, but arising by usage
of trade or through case law.
The language used is "must be
at least such as . . . ," and
the intention is to leave open
other possible attributes of merchantability.
7. Paragraphs (a) and (b)
of subsection (2) are to be read
together. Both refer, as indicated above, to the standards of
that line of the trade which fits
the transaction and the seller's
business. "Fair average" is a

term directly appropriate to agricultural bulk products and
means goods centering around
the middle belt of quality, not
the least or the worst that can
be understood in the particular
trade by the designation, but
such as can pass "without objection." Of course a fair percentage of the least is permissible but the goods are not "fair
average" if they are all of the
least or worst quality possible
under the description. In cases
of doubt as to what quality is
intended, the price at which a
merchant closes a contract is an
excellent index of the nature
and scope of his obligation under the present section.
8. Fitness for the ordinary
purposes for which goods of the
type are used is a fundamental
concept of the present section
and is covered in paragraph (c).
As stated above, merchantability
is also a part of the obligation
owing to the purchaser for use.
Correspondingly, protection, under this aspect of the warranty,
of the person buying for resale
to the ultimate consumer is
equally necessary, and merchantable goods must therefore
be "honestly" resalable in the
normal course of business because they are what they purport to be.
9. Paragraph (d) on evenness of kind, quality and quantity follows case law. But precautionary language has been
added as a reminder of the frequent usages of trade uhich permit substantial variations both
with and without an allowance
or an obligation to replace the
varying units.
10. Paragraph (e) applies
only where the nature of the
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goods and of the transaction
require a certain type of container, package or label. P a r a g r a p h (f) applies, on the other
hand, wherever t h e r e is a label
o r container on which representations a r e made, even though
the original contract, either by
express terms or usage of trade,
may not have required either the
labelling or the representation.
This follows from the general
obligation of good faith which
requires t h a t a buyer should
not be placed in the position of
reselling or using goods delivered under false representations
a p p e a r i n g on the package or
container. No problem of extra
consideration arises in this connection since, under this Article,
an obligation is imposed by the
original contract not to d c l h e r
mislabeled articles, and the obligation is imposed where mercantile good faith so requires
and without reference to the
doctrine of consideration.
11. Exclusion or modification
of the w a r r a n t y of merchantability, or of any part of it, is
dealt with in the section to
which the text of the present
section makes explicit precautionary references.
T h a t section mu.^t be read with particular reference to its sul^eetion
(4) on limitation of remedies.
The w a r r a n t y of merchantability, wherever it is normal, is so
commonly laken for granted t h a t
its exclusion from the contract
is a m a t t e r t h r e a t e n i n g surprise
and therefore r e q u i r i n g special
precaution.
12. Subsection (3) is to make
explicit t h a t usage of trade and
course of dealing can create
w a r r a n t i e s and t h a t they are
implied r a t h e r than express warr a n t i e s and thus subject to ex-
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clusion or modification u n d e r
Section 2—316. A typical instance wfould be the obligation to
provide pedigree papers to evidence conformity of the animal
to the contract in the case of a
pedigreed dog or blooded bull.
13. In an action based on
breach of warranty, it is of
course necessary to show not
only the existence of the warr a n t y but the fact t h a t t h e
w a r r a n t y was broken a n d t h a t
t h e breach of the w a r r a n t y was
t h e proximate cause of the loss
sustained. In such an action an
affirmative showing by the seller
t h a t the loss resulted from some
action or event following his
own delivery of the goods can
operate as a defense. Equally,
evidence indicating t h a t the seller exercised care in the manufacture, processing or selection
of the goods is relevant to t h e
issue of whether the w a r r a n t y
was in fact broken. Action by
the buyer following an examination of the goods which ought
to have indicated the defect
complained of can be shown as
m a t t e r bearing on whether t h e
breach itself was the cause of
the injury.
Cross References:
Point 1: Section 2—316.
Point 3 : Sections 1—2u3 and
2—104.
Point 5 : Section 2—315.
Point 1 1 : Section 2—316.
Point 12:
Sections 1—201,
1—205 and 2—316.
Definitional Cross References:
"Agreement". Section 1—201.
"Contract".
Section 1—201.
"Contract for sale". Section
2—106.
"Goods". Section 2—105.
" M e r c h a n t " . Section 2—104
"Seller". Section 2—103.

§ 2-316.

Exclusion or Modification of Warranties
(1) Words or conduct relevant to the creation of an express
warranty and words or conduct tending to negate or limit
warranty shall be construed wherever reasonable as consistent
with each other; but subject to the provisions of this Article
on parol or extrinsic evidence (Section 2—202) negation or
limitation is inoperative to the extent that such construction
is unreasonable.

(2) Subject to subsection (3), to exclude or modify the implied warranty of merchantability or any part of it the language must mention merchantability and in case of a writing must be conspicuous, and to exclude or modify any implied warranty of fitness the exclusion must be by a writing
and conspicuous. Language to exclude all implied warranties
of fitness is sufficient if it states, for example, that "There are
no warranties which extend beyond the description on the face
hereof."
(3) Notwithstanding subsection (2)
(a) unless the circumstances indicate otherwise, all implied warranties are excluded by expressions like "as
is", "with all faults" or other language which in common understanding calls the buyer's attention to the
exclusion of warranties and makes plain that there
is no implied warranty; and
(b) when the buyer before entering into the contract has
examined the goods or the sample or model as fully
as he desired or has refused to examine the goods
there is no implied warranty with regard to defects
which an examination ought in the circumstances to
have revealed to him; and
(c) an implied warranty can also be excluded or modified
by course of dealing or course of performance or usage
of trade.
(4) Remedies for breach of warranty can be limited in accordance with the provisions of this Article on liquidation or
limitation of damages and on contractual modification of remedy (Sections 2—718 and 2—719).
Official Comment
Prior Uniform Statutory Provision: None. See sections 15 and
71, Uniform Sales Act.
Purposes:
1. This section is designed
principally to deal with those
frequent clauses in sales contracts which seek to exclude "all
warranties, express or implied."
It seeks to protect a buyer from
unexpected and unbargained
language of disclaimer by denying effect to such language when

inconsistent with language of
express warranty and permitting the exclusion of implied
warranties only by conspicuous
language or other circumstances
which protect the buyer from
surprise.
2. The seller is protected under this Article against false
allegations of oral warranties by
its provisions on parol and extrinsic evidence and against unauthorized representations by
the customary "lack of author-
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ity" clauses. This Article treats
the limitation or avoidance of
consequential damages as a matter of limiting remedies for
breach, separate from the matter
of creation of liability under a
warranty. If no warranty exists, there is of course no problem of limiting remedies for
breach of warranty. Under subsection (4) the question of limitation of remedy is governed by
the sections referred to rather
than by this section.
3. Disclaimer of the implied
warranty of merchantability is
permitted under subsection (2),
but with the safeguard that such
disclaimers must mention merchantability and in case of a
writing must be conspicuous.
4. Unlike the implied warranty of merchantability, implied
warranties of fitness for a particular purpose may be excluded
by general language, but only if
it is in writing and conspicuous.
5. Subsection (2) presupposes that the implied warranty
in question exists unless excluded or modified. Whether or not
language of disclaimer satisfies
the requirements of this section,
such language may be relevant
under other sections to the question whether the warranty was
ever in fact created. Thus, unless the provisions of this Article on parol and extrinsic evidence prevent, oral language of
disclaimer may raise issues of
fact as to whether reliance by
the b.uyer occurred and whether
the seller had "reason to know"
tinder the section on implied
warranty of fitness for a particular purpose.
6. The exceptions to the general rule set forth in paragraphs
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(a), (b) and (c) of subsection
(3) are common factual situations in which the circumstances
surrounding the transaction are
in themselves sufficient to call
the buyer's attention to the fact
that no implied warranties are
made or that a certain implied
warranty is being excluded.
7. Paragraph (a) of subsection (3) deals with general terms
such as "as is," "as they stand,"
"with all faults," and the like.
Such terms in ordinary commercial usage are understood to
mean that the buyer takes the
entire risk as to the quality of
the goods involved. The terms
covered by paragraph (a) are
in fact merely a particularization of paragraph (c) which provides for exclusion or modification of implied warranties by
usage of trade.
8. Under paragraph (b) of
subsection (3) warranties may
be excluded or modified by the
circumstances where the buyer
examines the goods or a sample
or model of them before entering
into the contract. "Examination" as use;d in this paragraph
is not synonymous with inspection before acceptance or at any
other time after the contract has
been made. It goes rather to the
nature of the responsibility assumed by the seller at the time
of the making of the contract.
Of course if the buyer discovers
the defect and uses the goods
anyway, or if he unreasonably
fails to examine the goods before
he uses them, resulting injuries
may be found to result from his
own action rather than proximately from a breach of warranty. See Sections 2—314 and 2—
715 and comments thereto.
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In order to bring the transaction within the scope of "refused
to examine" in paragraph (b),
it is not sufficient that the goods
are available for inspection.
There must in addition be a demand by the seller that the buyer
examine the goods fully. The
seller by the demand puts the
buyer on notice that he is assuming the risk of defects which
the examination ought to reveal.
The language "refused to examine" in this paragraph is intended to make clear the necessity
for such demand.
Application of the doctrine of
"caveat emptor" in all cases
where the buyer examines the
goods regardless of statements
made by the seller is, however,
rejected by this Article. Thus,
if the offer of examination is accompanied by words as to their
merchantability or specific attributes and the buyer indicates
clearly that he is relying on
those words rather than on his
examination, they give rise to an
"express" warranty. In such
cases the question is one of fact
as to whether a warranty of merchantability has been expressly
incorporated in the agreement.
Disclaimer of such an express
warranty is governed by subsection (1) of the present section.
The particular buyer's skill
and the normal method of examining goods in the circumstances
determine what defects are excluded by the examination. A
failure to notice defects which
are obvious cannot excuse the
buyer. However, an examination under circumstances which
do not permit chemical or other
testing of the goods would not
exclude defects which could be

ascertained only by such testing.
Nor can latent defects be excluded by a simple examination. A
professional buyer examining a
product in his field will be held
to have assumed the risk as to all
defects which a professional in
the field ought to observe, while
a nonprofessional buyer will be
held to have assumed the risk
only for such defects as a layman might be expected to observe.
9. The situation in which the
buyer gives precise and complete
specifications to the seller is not
explicitly covered in this section, but this is a frequent circumstance by which the implied
warranties may be excluded.
The warranty of fitness for a
particular purpose would not
normally arise since in such a
situation there is usually no reliance on the seller by the buyer.
The warranty of merchantability
in such a transaction, however,
must be considered in connection
with the next section on the cumulation and conflict of warranties. Under paragraph (c) of
that section in case of such an
inconsistency the implied warranty of merchantability is displaced by the express warranty
that the goods will comply with
the specifications. Thus, where
the buyer gives detailed specifications as to the goods, neither
of the in^Ucd warranties as to
quality will normally apply to
the transaction unless consistent
with the specifications.
Cross References:
Point 2: Sections 2-202, 2—
718 and 2—719.
Point 7: Sections 1—205 and
2—2u8.

§ 2—601#
Buyer's Rights on Improper Delivery
Subject to the provisions of this Article on breach in installment contracts (Section 2—612) and unless otherwise agreed
under the sections on contractual limitations of remedy (Sections 2—718 and 2—719), if the goods or the tender of delivery
fail in any respect to conform to the contract, the buyer may
(a) reject the whole; or
(b) accept the whole; or
(c) accept any commercial unit or units and reject the rest.
Official Comment
Prior Uniform Statutory Provision: No one general equivalent
provision but numerous provisions, dealing with situations of
non-conformity where buyer may
accept or reject, including Sections 11, 44 and 69(1), Uniform
Sales Act.
Changes: Partial acceptance in
good faith is recognized and the
buyer's remedies on the contract
for breach of warranty and the
like, where the buyer has returned the goods after transfer
of title, are no longer barred.
Purposes of Changes: To make it
clear that:
1. A buyer accepting a nonconforming tender is not penalized by the loss of any remedy
otherwise open to him. This policy extends to cover and regulate
the acceptance of a part of any
lot improperly tendered in any
case where the price can reasonably be apportioned. Partial acceptance is permitted whether
the part of the goods accepted
conforms or not. The only limitation on partial acceptance is

that good faith and commercial
reasonableness must be used to
avoid undue impairment of the
value of the remaining portion of
the goods. This is the reason for
the insistence on the "commercial
unit" in paragraph (c). In this
respect, the test is not only what
unit has been the basis of contract, but whether the partial acceptance produces so materially
adverse an effect on the remainder as to constitute bad faith.
2. Acceptance made with the
knowiedge of the other party is
final. An original refusal to accept may be withdrawn by a later
acceptance if the seller has indicated that he is holding the tender open. However, if the buyer
attempts to accept, either in
whole or in part, after his original rejection has caused the seller to arrange for other disposition of the goods, the buyer must
answer for any ensuing damage
since the next section provides
that any exercise of ownership
after rejection is wrongful as
against the seller. Further, he
is liable even though the seller
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may choose to treat his action as
acceptance rather than conversion, since the damage f lows
from the misleading notice. Such
arrangements for resale or other
disposition of the goods by the
seller must be viewed as within
the normal contemplation of a
buyer who has given notice of rejection. However, the buyer's
attempts in good faith to dispose
of defective goods where the seller has failed to give instructions
within a reasonable time are not
to be regarded as an acceptance.

§ 2-602

Cross References:
Sections 2—602(2) Ca), 2—
612, 2—718 and 2—719.
definitional Cross References:
"Buyer". Section 2—103.
"Commercial unit". Section
2—105.
"Conform". Section 2—106.
"Contract". Section 1—201.
"Goods". Section 2—105.
"Installment contract". Section 2—612.
"Rights". Section 1—201.

§ 2—602.
Manner and Effect of Rightful Rejection
(1) Rejection of goods must be within a reasonable time after their delivery or tender. It is ineffective unless the buyer
seasonably notifies the seller.
(2) Subject to the provisions of the two following sections
on rejected goods (Sections 2—603 and 2—604),
(a) after rejection any exercise of ownership by the buyer
with respect to any commercial unit is wrongful as
against the seller; and
(b) if the buyer has before rejection taken physical possession of goods in which he does not have a security
interest under the provisions of this Article (subsection (3) of Section 2—711), he is under a duty after
rejection to hold them with reasonable care at the seller's disposition for a time sufficient to permit the seller
to remove them; but
(c) the buyer has no further obligations with regard to
goods rightfully rejected.
(3) The seller's rights with respect to goods wrongfully rejected are governed by the provisions of this Article on Seller's
remedies in general (Section 2—703).
Official Comment
Prior Uniform Statutory Provision: Section 50, Uniform Sales
ct
*
Changes: Rewritten.

Purposes of Changes: To make
it clear that:
1. A tender or delivery of
goods made pursuant to a contract of sale, even though wholly
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non-conforming, requires affirmative action by the buyer to avoid
acceptance. Under subsection
(1), therefore, the buyer is given
a reasonable time to notify the
seller of his rejection, but without such seasonable notification
his rejection is ineffective. The
sections of this Article dealing
with inspection of goods must
be read in connection with the
buyer's reasonable time for action under this subsection. Contract provisions limiting the time
for rejection fall within the rule
of the section on "Time" and are
effective if the time set gives the
buyer a reasonable time for discovery of defects. What constitutes a due "notifying" of rejection by the buyer to the seller
is defined in Section 1—201.
2. Subsection (2) lays down
the normal duties of the buyer
upon rejection, which flow from
the relationship of the parties.
Beyond his duty to hold the goods
with reasonable care for the buyer's [seller's] disposition, this section continues the policy of prior
uniform legislation in generally
relieving the buyer from any duties with respect to them, except
when the circumstances impose
the limited obligation of salvage
upon him under the next section.
3. The present section applies only to rightful rejection
by the buyer. If the seller has

made a tender which in all respects conforms to the contract,
the buyer has a positive duty to
accept and his failure to dp so
constitutes a "wrongful rejection" which gives the seller immediate remedies for breach.
Subsection (3) is included here
to emphasize the sharp distinction between the rejection of an
improper tender and the non-acceptance which is a breach by
the buyer.
4. The provisions of this
section are to be appropriately
limited or modified when a negotiation is in process.
Cross References:
Point 1: Sections 1—201, 1—
204(1) and (3), 2—512(2), 2—
513(1) and 2—606(1) (b).
Point 2: Section 2—603(1).
Point 3: Section 2—703.
Definitional Cross References:
"Buyer". Section 2—103.
"Commercial unit". Section
2—105.
"Goods". Section 2—105.
"Merchant". Section 2—104.
"Notifies". Section 1—201.
"Reasonable time".
Section
1—204.
"Remedy". Section 1—201.
"Rights". Section 1—201.
"Seasonably". Section 1—204.
"Security interest". Section
1—201.
"Seller". Section 2—103.

§ 2—606.
What Constitutes Acceptance of Goods
(1) Acceptance of goods occurs when the buyer
(a) after a reasonable opportunity to inspect the goods
signifies to the seller that the goods are conforming or
that he will take or retain them in spite of their nonconformity; or
(b) fails to make an effective rejection (subsection (1) of
Section 2—602), but such acceptance does not occur
until the buyer has had a reasonable opportunity to
inspect them; or
(c) does any act inconsistent with the seller's ownership;
but if such act is wrongful as against the seller it is
an acceptance only if ratified by him.
(2) Acceptance of a part of any commercial unit is acceptance of that entire unit.
Official Comment
Prior Uniform Statutory Provision: Section 48, Uniform Sales
Act.

Changes: Rewritten, the qualification in paragraph (c) and subsection (2) being new; other-

SALES
wise the general policy of the
prior legislation is continued.
Purposes of Changes and New
Matter: To make it clear that:
1. Under this Article "acceptance" as applied to goods means
that the buyer, pursuant to the
contract, takes particular goods
which have been appropriated to
the contract as his own, whether
or not he is obligated to do so,
and whether he does so by words,
action, or silence when it is time
to speak. If the goods conform
to the contract, acceptance
amounts only to the performance by the buyer of one part of
his legal obligation.
2. Under this Article acceptance of goods is always acceptance of identified goods which
have been appropriated to the
contract or are appropriated by
the contract. There is no provision for "acceptance of title"
apart from acceptance in general, since acceptance of title is
not material under this Article
to the detailed rights and duties
of the parties. (See Section 2—
401). The refinements of the
older law between acceptance of
goodi and of title become unnecessary in view of the provisions
of the sections on effect and revocation of acceptance, on effects
of identification and on risk of
loss, and those sections which
free the seller's and buyer's remedies from the complications and
confusions caused by the question of whether title has or has
not passed to the buyer before
breach.
3. Under
paragraph
(a),
payment made after tender is always one circumstance tending
to signify acceptance of the
goods but in itself it can never
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be more than one circumstance
and is not conclusive. Also, a
conditional communication of acceptance always remains subject
to its expressed conditions.
4. Under paragraph (c), any
action taken by the buyer, which
is inconsistent with his claim
that he has rejected the goods,
constitutes an acceptance. However, the provisions of paragraph (c) are subject to the sections dealing with rejection by
the buyer which permit the buyer to take certain actions with
respect to the goods pursuant to
his options and duties imposed
by those sections, without effecting an acceptance of the goods.
The second clause of paragraph
(c) modifies some of the prior
case law and makes it clear that
"acceptance" in law based on the
wrongful act of the acceptor is
acceptance only as against the
wrongdoer and then only at the
option of the part^' wronged.
In the same mahner in which
a buyer can bind himself, despite
his insistence that he is rejecting or has rejected the goods, by
an act inconsistent with the seller's ownership under paragraph
( c \ he can obligate himself by a
communication of acceptance despite a prior rejection under paragraph (,a). However, the sections on buyer's rights on improper delivery and on the effect
of rightful rejection, make it
clear that after he once rejects a
tender, paragraph (a) does not
operate in favor of| the buyer unless the seller has re-tendered
the goods or has taken affirmative action indicating that he is
holding the tender open. See
also Comment 2 to Section 2—
Gol.

§ 2—606

UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE

5. Subsection (2) supplements the policy of the section
on buyer's rights on improper
delivery, recognizing the validity of a partial acceptance but insisting that the buyer exercise
this right only as to whole commercial units.
Cross References:
Point 2: Sections 2—401, 2—
509, 2—510, 2—607, 2—G08 and
Part 7.
§ 2—607.

Point 4:
Sections 2—601
through 2-—604.
Point 5: Section 2—601
Definitional Cross References:
"Buyer". Section 2—103.
"Commercial unit". Section
2—105.
"Goods". Section 2—105.
"Seller"., Section 2—103.

Effect of Acceptance; Notice of Breach; Burden
of Establishing Breach After Acceptance; Notice of Claim or Litigation to Person Answerable Over

(1) The buyer must pay at the contract rate for any goods
accepted.
(2) Acceptance of goods by the buyer precludes rejection of
the goods accepted and if made with knowledge of a non-conformity cannot be revoked because of it unless the acceptance
was on the reasonable assumption that the non-conformity
would be seasonably cured but acceptance does not of itself impair any other remedy provided by this Article for non-conformity.
(3) Where a tender has been accepted
(a) the buyer must within a reasonable time after he discovers or should have discovered any breach notify
the seller of breach or be barred from any remedy;
and
(b) if the claim is one for infringement or the like (subsection (3) of Section 2—312) and the buyer is sued
as a result of such a breach he must so notify the seller
within a reasonable time after he receives notice of
the litigation or be barred from any remedy over for
liability established by the litigation.
(4) The burden is on the buyer to establish any breach with
respect to the goods accepted.
(5) Where the biner is sued for breach of a warranty or other obligation for which his seller is answerable over
(a) he may give his seller written notice of the litigation.
If the notice states that the seller may come in and de-
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fend and that if the seller does not do so he will be
bound in any action against him by his buyer by any
determination of fact common to the two litigations,
then unless the seller after seasonable receipt of the
notice does come in and defend he is so bound,
(b) if the claim is one for infringement or the like (subsection (3) of Section 2—312) the original seller may
demand in writing that his buyer turn over to him control of the litigation including settlement or else be
barred from any remedy over and if he also agrees to
bear all expense and to satisfy any adverse judgment,
then unless the buyer after seasonable receipt of the
demand does turn over control the buyer is so barred.
(6) The provisions of subsections (3), (4) and (5) apply
to any obligation of a buyer to hold the seller harmless against
infringement or the like (subsection (3) of Section 2—312).
Official Comment
Prior Uniform Statutory Provision: Subsection (1)—Section
41, Uniform Sales Act; Subsections (2) and (3)—Sections 49
and 69, Uniform Sales Act.
Changes: Rewritten.
Purposes of Changes: To continue the prior basic policies
with respect to acceptance of
goods while making a number
of minor though material changes in the interest of simplicity
and commercial convenience so
that:
1. Under subsection (1), once
the buyer accepts a tender the
seller acquires a right to its
price on the contract terms. In
cases of partial acceptance, the
price of any part accepted is, if
possible, to be reasonably apportioned, using the type of apportionment familiar to the courts
in quantum valebat cases, to be
determined in terms of "the contract rate," which is the rate determined from the bargain in
fact (the agreement) after the

rules and policies of this Article
have been brought to bear.
2. Under subsection (2) acceptance of goods precludes
their subsequent rejection. Any
return of the goods thereafter
must be by way of revocation of
acceptance under the next section. Revocation is unavailable
for a non-conformity known to
the buyer at the time of acceptance, except where the buyer has
accepted on the reasonable assumption that the non-conformity would be >ea*>unably cured.
3. All other remedies of the
buyer remain unimpaired under
subsection (2). This is intended
to include the buyer's full rights
with respect to future installments despite his acceptance of
any earlier non-conforming installment.
4. The time of notification is
to be determined by applying
commercial standards to a merchant buyer.
"A reasonable
time" for notification from a re-
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tail consumer is to be judged by
different standards so that in
his case it will be extended, for
the rule of requiring notification
is designed to defeat commercial
bad faith, not to deprive a good
faith consumer of his remedy.
The content of the notification
need merely be sufficient to let
the seller know that the transaction is still troublesome and
must be watched. There is no
reason to require that the notification which saves the buyer's
rights under this section must
include a clear statement of all
the objections that will be relied on by the buyer, as under
the section covering statements
of defects upon rejection (Section 2—G05). Nor is there reason for requiring the notification to be a claim for damages or
of any threatened litigation or
other resort to a remedy. The
notification which saves the buyer's rights under this Article
need only be such as informs the
seller that the transaction is
claimed to involve a breach, and
thus opens the way for normal
settlement through negotiation.
5. Under this Article various
beneficiaries are given rights for
injuries sustained by them because of the seller's breach of
warranty. Such a beneficiary
does not fall within the reason
of the present section in regard
to discovery of defects and the
giving of notice within a reasonable time after acceptance, since
he has nothing to do with acceptance. However, the reason of
this section does extend to requiring the beneficiary to notify
the seller that an injury has occurred. What is said above,
with regard to the extended time

for reasonable notification from
the lay consumer after the injury is also applicable here; but
even a beneficiary can be properly held to the use of good faith
in notifying, once he has had
time to become aware of the legal situation.
6. Subsection (4) unambiguously places the burden of proof
to establish breach on the buyer
after acceptance. However, this
rule becomes one purely of procedure when the tender accepted
was non-conforming and the buyer has given the seller notice of
breach under subsection (3) 0
For subsection (2) makes it
clear that acceptance leaves unimpaired the buyer's right to be
made whole, and that right can
be exercised by the buyer not
only by way of cross-claim for
damage?, but also by way of recoupment in diminution or extinction of the price.
7. Subsections (3) (b) and
(5) (b) give a warrantor against
infringement an opportunity to
defend or compromise third-party claims or be relieved of his
liability.
Subsection (5) (a)
codifies for all warranties the
practice of voucher to defend.
Compare Section 3—8u3. Subsection (0) makes these provisions applicable to the buyer's liability for infringement under
Section 2—312.
8. All of the provisions of the
present section are subject to
any explicit reservation of
rights.
Cross References:
Point 1: Section 1—201.
Point 2: Section 2—608.
Point 4: Sections 1—204 and
2—G05.
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Point
Point
Point
3—803
Point
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"Buyer". Section 2—103.
"Conform". Section 2—106.
"Contract". Section 1—201.
"Goods". Section 2—105.
"Notifies". Section 1—201.
"Reasonable time".
Section
1—204.
"Remedy". Section 1—201.
"Seasonably". Section 1—204.

5: Section 2 --318.
6: Section 2 --717
7: Sections 2--312 and
8: Section 1--207.

Definitional Cross References:
"Burden
of
establishing"
Section 1—201.

§ 2—608.
Revocation of Acceptance in Whole or in Part
(1) The buyer may revoke his acceptance of a lot or commercial unit whose non-conformity substantially impairs its value
to him if he has accepted it
(a) on the reasonable assumption that its non-conformity
would be cured and it has not been seasonably cured;
or
(b) without discovery of such non-conformity if his acceptance was leasonablv induced either by the difficultv of discoveiv befoie acceptance or by the sellers
assuiances.
(2) Revocation of acceptance must occur within a reasonable time after the Inner discovers or should have discovered
the ground for it and befoie anv substantial change in condition of the goods which is not caused by their owil defects. It
is not effective until the buvei notifies the seller of it
(3) A buvei who so Ievokes has the same rights and duties
with legaid to the goods involved as if he had rejected them.
Official Comment
Prior Uniform Statutory Provision: Siction 09(1) ( d \ (3),
v4) and (5), Lniform Sales Act
Changes: Rewntten
Purposes of Changes: To make
it clear that
1 Although the prior basic
polic> is continued, the bu>er is
no longer required to elect between revocation of acceptance
and recovery of damages for
bicach Both A\Q now available
to him
The non-alUrnative
character of the two remedies is

strewed bv the teims used in the
present section The section no
longer speaks of 'lescisbion," a
teim capable of ambiguoub application cither to transfer of title to the goods or io the contiact
of sale and susceptible also of
confusion with cancellation for
cause of an executed or executoiy portion of the contract
The lemedy under this section is
instead referred to simply as
"revocation of acceptance" of
goods tendeied under a contract
for sale and involves no suggestion of "election ' of any soit.
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2. Revocation of acceptance
is possible only where the nonconformity substantially impairs
the value of the goods to the buyer. For this purpose the test is
not what the seller had reason
to know at the time of contracting; the question is whether the
non-conformity is such as will in
fact cause a substantial impairment of value to the buyer
though the seller had no advance
knowledge as to the buyer's particular circumstances.
3. "Assurances" by the seller
under paragraph (b) of subsection (1) can rest as well in the
circumstances or in the contract
as in explicit language used at
the time of delivery. The reason
for recognizing such assurances
is that they induce the buyer to
delay discovery. These are the
only assurances involved in paragraph (b). Explicit assurances may be made either in good
faith or bad faith. In either
case any remedy accorded by
this Article is available to the
buyer under the section on remedies for fraud.
4. Subsection (2) requires
notification of revocation of acceptance within a reasonable
time after discovery cf the
grounds for such revocation.
Since this remedy will be generally resorted to only after attempts at adjustment have
failed, the reasonable time penod should extend in most cases
beyond the time in which notification of breach must be given,
beyond the time for discovery of
non-conformity after acceptance
and beyond the time for rejection after tender. The parties
may by their agreement limit the
time for notification under this
section, but the same sanctions

and considerations apply to such
agreements as are discussed in
the comment on manner and effect of rightful rejection.
5. The content of the notice
under subsection (2) is to be determined in this case as in others by considerations of good
faith, prevention of surprise,
and
reasonable
adjustment.
More will generally be necessary
than the mere notification of
breach required under the preceding section. On the other
hand the requirements of the
section on waiver of buyer's objections do not apply here. The
fact that quick notification of
trouble is desirable affords good
ground for being slow to bind a
buyer by his first statement.
Following the general policy of
this Article, the requirements of
the content of notification are
less stringent in the case of a
non-merchant buyer.
6. Under subsection (2) the
prior policy is continued of seeking substantial justice in regard
to the condition of goods restored to the seller. Thus the buyer
may not revoke his acceptance
if the goods have materially deteriorated except by reason of
their own defects. Worthless
goods, however, need not be offered back and minor defects in
the articles reofTered are to be
disregarded.
7. The policy of the section
allowing partial acceptance is
carried over into the present section and the buyer may revoke
his acceptance, in appropriate
cases, as to the entire lot or any
commercial unit thereof.
Cross References:
Point 3: Section 2—721.
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Buyer's Remedies in General; Buyer's Security
Interest in Rejected Goods
(1) Where the seller fails to make delivery o^ repudiates or
the buyer rightfully rejects or justifiably revokes acceptance
then with respect to any goods in\ olved, and with respect to the
whole if the breach goes to the whole contract (Section 2—612),
the buyer may cancel and whether or not he has done so may in
addition to recovering so much of the price as has been paid
(a) "cover" and ha\e damages under the next section as
to all the goods affected whether or not they have been
identified to the contract; or
(b) recover damages for non-deli\ery as provided in this
Article (Section 2—713).
(2) Where the seller fails to delhei or repudiates the buyer
may also
(a) if the goods have been identified lecover them as provided in this Article (Section 2—302); or
(b) in a proper case obtain specific perfoimance or replevy
the goods as provided in this Article (Section 2—716).
(3) On rightful rejection or justifiable revocation of acceptance a buyer has a security interest in goods in his possession
or control for any payments made on their puce and any expenses reasonably incurred in their inspection, receipt, transportation, care and custody and may hold such goods and le^eil them
in like manner as an aggrieved seller (Section 2—706).
Official Comment
Prior
sion:
tion;
G0v5),

Uniform Statutory ProviNo comparable index secSubsection
(3)—Section
Uniform Sales Act.

Changes:
The p n o r unifoim
s t a t u l o i y piovi&ion is generally
continued and expanded in Subsection {C>)
Purposes of Changes and NewMatter:
1. To index in this section
the buver's remedies, subsection
(1) c o \ e n n g those remedies perm i t t i n g the r c c o \ e r y of money
damage*, and subsection (2)
co\ c i i n g those which permit

u u h i n g the goods t h e m s e h e s
T i e l e m t d i e s JMed hcie are
those a\ a liable to a bu>er who
has not accepted the goods or
who has justifiably levoked his
actv.ptai ce The lcmedies available to a I n n e r with l e g a r d to
goods finally accepted appear in
the section dealing with breach
in regard to accepted goods
The bu\<i s l i g h t to pioceed as
to all goods when the breach is
as to o n h some, of the goods is
determined by the section on
breach in installment contracts
and by the section on partial acceptance.
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Despite the seller's breach,
proper retender of delivery under the section on cure of improper tender or replacement
can effectively preclude the buyer's remedies under this section,
except for any delay involved.
2. To make it clear in subsection (3) that the buyer may hold
and resell rejected goods if he
has paid a pait of the price or
incurred expenses of the type
specified
"Paid" as used here
includes acceptance of a draft
or other time negotiable instrument or the signing of a negotiable note. His fieedom of resale is coextensive with that of a
seller under this Article except
•hat the buver may not keep any
profit resulting fiom the resale
and is limited to retaining only
the amount of the puce paid and
the costs invohed in the inspection and handling of the goods
The bu\ei s secunty interest in
the goorib is intended to be limited to the items libted in subbection (3), and the bu>er is not
permitted to letain such funds
as ho mirht b e h e \ e adequate for
his dam i^eb The binei s right
to cover er to h a \ e dimages for
n o n - d t h \ t r \ , is not impaired by

his exercise of his right of resale
3 It should also be noted that
this Act requnes its remedies to
be libei ally administered and
provides that any right or obligation which it declares is enforceable by action unless a different effect is specificilly prescribed (Stction 1—106)
Cro^s References:
Point 1: Sections 2 - 3 0 8 , 2—
601(c), 2—608, 2—612 and 2—
714
Point 2* Section 2—706
Point 3- Section 1—106
Definitional Cross References:
"Aggrieved part}".
Section
1—201
"Buyer". Section 2—103.
"Cancellation".
Section 2—
106
"Contract"
Section 1—201.
"Cover" Section 2—712.
"Goods" Section 2—105
"Notifies"
Section 1—201
"Receipt" of goods
Section
2—10°,
"Remedy"
Section I—201.
"Secuuty interest"
Section
1—201
"Sellei"
Section 2—1^3

CONSUMER PRODUCT WARRANTIES

15 USCS § 2308

12308* Implied warranties
(t) Restrictions on disclaimers or modifications. No supplier may disclaim
or modify (except as provided in subsection (b)) any implied warranty to a
consumer with respect to such consumer product if (1) such supplier
makes any written warranty to the consumer with respect to such consumer product, or (2) at the time of sale, or within 90 days thereafter, such
supplier enters into a service contract with the consumer which applies to
such consumer product,
(b) Limitation on duration. For purposes of this title [15 USCS §§ 2301 et
seq/j (other than section 104(a)(2)) [15 USCS § 2304(a)(2)] implied warranties may be limited in duration to the duration of a written warranty of
reasonable duration, if such limitation is conscionable and is set forth in
dear and unmistakable language and prominently displayed on the face of
the warranty,
(c) Effectiveness of disclaimers, modifications, or limitations. A disclaimer,
modification, or limitation made in violation of this section shall be
ineffective for purposes of this title [15 USCS § 2304(a)] and State law.
(Ian. 4, 1975, P. L. 93-637, Title I, § 108, 88 Stat. 2189.)
HISTORY; ANCILLARY LAWS AND DIRECTIVES
Effective date of section:
For effective date of section, see 15 USCS § 2312.
Other provisions:
For application of this section, see 15 USCS § 2312.
CROSS REFERENCES
Definitions, 15 USCS § 2301.
Requirement that full warranty may not impose duration limitation on
implied warranties, 15 USCS § 2304(aX2).
RESEARCH GUIDE
Am Jon
55 Am Jur 2d, Monopolies, Restraints of Trade, and Unfair Trade
Practices §§771.5-771.10.
67 Am Jur 2d, Sales §§ 425-513.
Am Jur Proof of Facts:
Precast Concrete: Defective Design or Manufacture, 16 Am Jur Proof
of Facts 2d, p. 595.
Annotations:
Products liability: personal injury or death allegedly caused by defect in
electrical system in motor vehicle. 5 ALR4th 662.
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PART 455—USED MOTOR VEHICLE
TRADE REGULATION RULE

Sec.
455.1 General duties of a used vehicle
dealer, definitions.
455.2 Consumer sales—window form.
455.3 Window form.
455.4 Contrary statements.
455.5 Spanish language sales.
455.6 State exemptions.
455.7 Severability.
AUTHORITY: 88 Stat. 2189. 15 U.S.C. 2309;
38 Stat. 717, as amended 15 UJ3.C. 41 et seq.
SOURCE: 49 FR 45725, Nov. 19, 1984, unless
otherwise noted.
EDITORIAL NOTE: At 50 FR 50163, Dec 9,

1985, in Part 455, the effective date ot the
Used Car Rule as it applies within the State
of Wisconsin was temporarily stayed to
June 3,1986.
§455.1 General duties of a used vehicle
dealer; definitions.
(a) It is a deceptive act or practice
for any used vehicle dealer, when that
dealer sells or offers for sale a used vehicle in or affecting commerce as
"commerce" is defined in the Federal
Trade Commission Act:
(1) To misrepresent the mechanical
condition of a used vehicle;
(2) To misrepresent the terms of any
warranty offered in connection with
the sale of a used vehicle; and
(3) To represent that abused vehicle
is sold with a warranty when the vehicle is sold without any warranty.
(b) It is an unfair act or practice for
any used vehicle dealer, when that
dealer sells or offers for sale a used vehicle in or affecting commerce as
"commerce" is defined in the Federal
Trade Commission Act:
(1) To fail to disclose, prior to sale,
that a used vehicle is sold without any
warranty; and
(2) To fail to make available, prior to
sale, the terms of any written warranty offered in connection with the sale
of a used vehicle.

(c) The Commission has adopted
this Rule in order to prevent the
unfair and deceptive acts or practices
defined in paragraphs (a) and (b). It is
a violation of this Rule for any used
vehicle dealer to fail to comply with
the requirements set forth in §§455.2
through 455.5 of this part. If a used
vehicle dealer complies with the requirements of §§455.2 through 455.5
of this part, the dealer does not violate
this Rule, (d) The following definitions shall apply for purposes of this
part:
(1) "Vehicle" means any motorized
vehicle, other than a motorcycle, with
a gross vehicle weight rating (GVWR)
of less than 8500 lbs., a curb weight of
less than 6,000 lbs., and a frontal area
of less than 46 sq. ft.
(2) "Used vehicle" means any vehicle
driven more than the limited use necessary in moving or road testing a new
vehicle prior to delivery to a consumer, but does not include any vehicle sold only for scrap or parts (title
documents surrendered to the State
and a salvage certificate issued).
(3) "Dealer" means any person or
business which sells or offers for sale a
used vehicle after selling or offering
for sale five (5) or more used vehicles
in the previous twelve months, but
does not include a bank or financial in-

